I’ve struggled to develop concepts and language around the idea of “enceptions”, a capacity to take-as-given some form of experience, whether concept or percept. These forms are received as gestalt wholes, and poking around etymonline.com I’ve succumbed to the temptation to steal some Heideggerian jargon and use it in a clashingly confusing way: gestell. A gestell or enception — I am using them synonymously — receives some experience as a gestalt.
An enception is not — and necessarily cannot be — an intentional object of experience, but is rather a condition for any objective given. To steal and misuse yet more jargon from eminent Germans, an enception (or gestell) is a transcendental “category”. My Kantianism is akin to Cassirer’s.
So givenness of a form is dependent on a capacity to take it. This much is simple. But how does one account for enceptions, especially with respect to acquisition of new capacities?
One central fact must be considered: enceptions rarely, if ever, occur in isolation. They tend to change entire fields of experience, as if crystallizing a supersaturated solution of perplexity. A re-understanding of one particular truth seems to ripple instantaneously across one’s understanding of everything, on the whole and in every part.
I’m re-rereading my all-time favorite book, by Richard J. Bernstein, and in it he quotes Thomas Kuhn saying:
When reading the works of an important thinker, look first for the apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have written them. When you find an answer, …when these passages make sense, then you may find that more central passages, ones you previously thought you understood, have changed their meaning.
But does the change really originate in the particular idea? Does the change of understanding radiate outward from the idea in question?
The question reminds me of our casual notions of lightning. We tend to assume movement from some set point of origin in the sky. But the apparent movement of lightning is not an object moving from one place to another — bolts mythically hurled from clouds — but, rather, a charged field, the site of a complex resolution of destabilized difference, that dramatically strikes certain objects in the path of change. What seems to be the origin is sometimes the destination, or one of multiple origins destined to meet at one or more cracking midpoints.
Increasingly, enceptions strike me as articulations of an all-inclusive field, and that the field itself somehow determines the natural jointing of the articulations. And our own linguistic articulation tends to follow the forking fracture-lines of this field, producing the famous and disputed correspondence between word and thing.
According to this conception, the field itself — the all-inclusive “everything” — is what changes, and the focal object, the thing that induced the change to the field, is one of myriad simultaneous effects in this restructuring of the field.
The field is all-inclusive everything both actual and possible, beyond which nothing can be conceived, and therefore exteriorless — at least objectively.
This is what Levinas called a totality. And Heidegger’s gestell (as opposed to my own) is clearly (at least as it seems to me) an example of one totality that takes givens in a distinctive way.
Some totalities confuse their apparent all-inclusivity with infinity.
But a totality is a quasi-infinitude. Each totality is only one of a plurality — one within One — a real, realistic image of a reality that infinitely exceeds its comprehension.
Each totality strives to contain all others, and to the degree it succeeds, it fails.
Despite the philosopher who, as a genuine Englishman, tried to bring laughter into bad repute in all thinking minds — “Laughing is a bad infirmity of human nature, which every thinking mind will strive to overcome” (Hobbes) — I would even allow myself to rank philosophers according to the quality of their laughing — up to those who are capable of golden laughter. And supposing that Gods also philosophize, which I am strongly inclined to believe, owing to many reasons — I have no doubt that they also know how to laugh thereby in an overman-like and new fashion — and at the expense of all serious things! Gods are fond of ridicule: it seems that they cannot refrain from laughter even in holy matters. — Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
Conception articulates ideal forms from an all-comprehensive, exteriorless whole — a quasi-infinity. The articulations are capacities to take as given a set of possible and actual forms within a given reality.
This is why our fundamental conceptions matter so much to us — our metaphysics, our key symbols, our founding stories, our given truths — literally everything and every given thing is at stake.
Construction combines givens into systems of various complexity and scale.
Construction builds up larger units from smaller ones, but every unit is given by conception, each articulated from the largest conceivable universal unit.
But some construction can destabilize the conceptive order.
And some construction can force a partial or total reconception.
Like forking lightning the totality shatters the whole into new articulations and new shards, new givens.