It is important to learn where you can and cannot make promises.
Not only does this help you avoid conflict and alienation, it draws you a map of the public and private regions of your soul.
It is important to learn where you can and cannot make promises.
Not only does this help you avoid conflict and alienation, it draws you a map of the public and private regions of your soul.
The last month has been filled with broken promises of many kinds — explicit and implicit, asserted and implied, formal and informal, word and spirit. I can list at least a half-dozen major examples, and probably a dozen more minor ones.
*
I am going to be stingier is accepting promises — and in making them. Not all people are worthy of exchanging promises. I can no longer default to trust. I must learn the art of being cheerful about being let down by dishonorable majority.
*
Wherever you have failed to make your word good, your word is worthless.
“Form of oath. — ‘If I am now lying I am no longer a decent human being and anyone may tell me so to my face.’ — I recommend this form of oath in place of the judicial oath with its customary invocation of God: it is stronger. Even the pious person has no reason to oppose it: for as soon as the sanction of the oath hitherto in use begins to be applied vainly, the pious person must give ear to his catechism, which prescribes ‘thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain!'”
Commitments are predictions we work to make true.
*
A futurist who fails to say true things about the future lacks skill.
A promiser who fails to say true things about the future lacks integrity.
Reason is always logical, but logic is not always reasonable.
Whatever is reasonable is always arguable, but not every argument is reasonable; and therefore arguments alone are not sufficient to distinguish reason from unreason.
Reason transcends argument. Reason knows it is completed only by what always stands beyond the limits of intelligibility.
*
To the degree an argument is untested, that argument remains arguable.
To the degree an argument is unaware of the tests that can invalidate it, that argument is naive.
To the degree an argument is unconcerned about tests that can invalidate it, that argument is complacent.
To the degree an argument is hostile to tests that can invalidate it, that argument is ideological.
To the degree an argument does not conceive tests that can invalidate it, that argument is blind.
To the degree an argument conceives the failure to conceive tests that can invalidate it as nonexistence of such tests, that argument is blind to blindness.
To the degree an argument confuses mere arguability with truth, that argument is unreasonable.
*
Among my unpopular convictions is this one: Religion is essentially reasonable. Ideologies built with logical arguments that reject the cornerstone of reason are not religions; they are fundamentalisms.
Fundamentalism is the dead opposite of religion.
*
A universal scientific method moved by awareness of argumentative limits and of reason’s permanent dependence on mind-transcending realities — an active desire to submit one’s arguments to the judgment of what stands invisibly beyond mind — and consequent mistrust of self-evident certainty — is pious.
I had a thought last week I want to record for later use.
Short version.
Some notes.
Art is a thing from an everything — an emissary part from an implied whole. It might be a magical thing that seems to belong to an unknown everything, promising there is more to reality than we have known. Or it maybe an expressive thing that belongs to my own unknown everything, promising I am not alone in weirdness.
I cannot help but believe that liberalism requires a degree of toughness. Why? Because modern liberalism stands on a foundation of pluralism, and pluralism implies the permanent presence of incommensurable beliefs and radical conflict. Knowing how to represent one’s own positions, while maintaining respect and goodwill, where parties disagree on what the disagreement is and methods for resolving disagreements are themselves contested — in other words, the skills of agonism — this is basic liberal competence.
People who storm about demanding a public sphere so gentle it favors their kind of delicate development and eventual full flourishing are not liberal.
*
In a liberal world, one cannot legitimately be offended by the raising of controversial questions — but perhaps we ought to be offended by refusal to participate in their asking.
“OK, but who decides that?”: this is the liberal question.
Society should be just? Ok, but who decides what justice is? All people should be given an equal chance to flourish? Ok, who decides what equality is? People should be free within reasonable limits. Ok, but… People’s basic rights should be respected. Ok, but… Etc.
In the realm of liberalism, where assertions of principle are followed by the liberal “ok, but” questions are rarely answered; they are hammered out with the crucial but possible impossible goal of eventual agreement.
(Having goals is more important than achieving them.)
When conducting design research in a team context we uncover general truths about groups of people, but in the process we uncover profound specific truths about our fellow researchers.
*
To know someone deeply, reflect with that person on the thoughts and behaviors of other people.
*
Maybe this provides us one charitable explanation of the appeal of gossip?: of all conversational genres, gossip gives us the most intimate glimpse into one another’s souls.
At Babel the dust and gravel stands erect, each fragment firm on its foundation, proudly piercing its own low heaven.
I went to a Baptist church for a few weeks. They were nice people. They preach an ultimate reality who is alive with love for them. But they also teach a reality peopled with hateful and wicked neighbors.
If they are right, they are also not right enough. Their insufficiency is not in what they affirm, but in what they oppose: those who they are not.
*
When I was young I was a left-liberal who thought all conservatives were stupid and mean. Then I met some smart, nice conservatives who helped me see how liberals opposed themselves to only the stupidest and meanest conservatives, and how they did this to justify their own flavor of mean stupidity. Years later I found some even smarter, even nicer liberals, and saw how my conservative friends were ignoring the best liberals, in order to elevate themselves above liberalism in general. And then I looked up into heaven and imagined alternating layers of better and better conservatisms and liberalisms, each trying to be more right and less wrong, and maybe at some rarefied altitude starting to crave justice for who they are not.
*
Perhaps morality consists not in who we are, but rather in who we aren’t.
*
“And one of them, a lawyer, asked him a question, to test him. ‘Teacher, which is the great commandment in the law?’ And he said to him, ‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments depend all the law and the prophets.'”
Find a quiet place and sit down. Still your mind. Breathe. Inhale and exhale naturally. Concentrate on your bare breath. Do not force your mind or body to do anything. Be in the present. Your mind will wander, and when it does, gently bring it back to the present, to here, to now, to awareness of here and now. Give yourself some much needed relief from the torments of transcendence. This is the dead opposite of religion, and for this reason it is bliss.
Every soul is the size of the entire known universe, containing every known thing within it, endures for all time from the earliest known pre-history to the most distant imaginable future, and encompasses every conceivable possibility. Therefore, no two souls are alike.
Souls vary in size, density, variety and complexity. Souls overlap in reality, but weave through realities differently, touching, entangling, moving and being moved by different beings.
Some souls have space in them for your soul, and are happy to extend you hospitality. Some souls seek your hospitality. Other souls need your soul locked up inside your silent body.
Tillich (from The Courage to Be):
The whole [Enlightenment] period believed in the principle of “harmony” — harmony being the law of the universe according to which the activities of the individual, however individualistically conceived and performed, lead “behind the back” of the single actor to a harmonious whole, to a truth in which at least a large majority can agree, to a good in which more and more people can participate, to a conformity which is based on the free activity of every individual. The individual can be free without destroying the group. The functioning of economic liberalism seemed to confirm this view: the laws of the market produce, behind the backs of the competitors in the market, the greatest possible amount of goods for everybody. The functioning of liberal democracy showed that the freedom of the individual to decide politically does not necessarily destroy political conformity. Scientific progress showed that individual research and the freedom for individual scientific convictions do not prevent a large measure of scientific agreement. Education showed that emphasis on the free development of the individual child does not reduce the chances of his becoming an active member of a conformist society. And the history of Protestantism confirmed the belief of the Reformers that the free encounter of everybody with the Bible can create an ecclesiastical conformity in spite of individual and even denominational differences. Therefore it was by no means absurd when Leibnitz formulated the law of preestablished harmony by teaching that the monads of which all things consist, although they have no doors and windows that open toward each other, participate in the same world which is present in each of them, whether it be dimly or clearly perceived. The problem of individualization and participation seemed to be solved philosophically as well as practically.
It is the belief in a preexisting harmony that separates the classical Enlightenment view from a Postenlightenment view. I believe in disharmonious reasons, which is another way of saying that I believe in Pluralism. To extend the music analogy, reason does not produce chords, it produces a chromatic scale, from which harmonies can be made, but only if sour reasonable notes are muted, at least until the melody progresses and the key changes, making the formerly sour note sweet. A harmonious truth must be designed, and design always means making good tradeoffs.
Putting it as succinctly as possible, design thinking is a perspective on problems:
Problem finding
Problem shaping
- The problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution.
- Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
- Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong.
- Every wicked problem is essentially novel and unique.
- Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one shot operation.’
- Wicked problems have no given alternative solutions.
Problem solving
Sometimes I admire people as examples of the kind of person I would like to be. This is a kind of admiration of an aspirational future self.
But I try to also admire people who are utterly unlike me, people I could never emulate without undermine who I am trying to be. I admire them as collaborative partners with whom I might accomplish things I could not accomplish by myself.
I consider this admiration of otherness in potential collaboration superior and rarer than admiration of potential likeness. Both of these, however, are superior to admiration of inaccessibly distant otherness, which in extreme form is worship.
From Tillich’s The Courage to Be:
What does self-affirmation mean if there is no self, e.g. in the inorganic realm or in the infinite substance, in being-itself? Is it not an argument against the ontological character of courage that it is impossible to attribute courage to large sections of reality and to the essence of all reality? Is courage not a human quality which can be attributed even to higher animals only by analogy but not properly? Does this not decide for the moral against the ontological understanding of courage? In stating this argument one is reminded of similar arguments against most metaphysical concepts in the history of human thought. Concepts like world soul, microcosmos, instinct, the will to power, and so on have been accused of introducing subjectivity into the objective realm of things. But these accusations are mistaken. They miss the meaning of ontological concepts. It is not the function of these concepts to describe the ontological nature of reality in terms of the subjective or the objective side of our ordinary experience. It is the function of an ontological concept to use some realm of experience to point to characteristics of being-itself which lie above the split between subjectivity and objectivity and which therefore cannot be expressed literally in terms taken from the subjective or the objective side. Ontology speaks analogously. Being as being transcends objectivity as well as subjectivity. But in order to approach it cognitively one must use both. And one can do so because both are rooted in that which transcends them, in being-itself. It is the light of this consideration that the ontological concepts referred to must be interpreted. They must be understood not literally but analogously. This does not mean that they have been produced arbitrarily and can easily be replaced by other concepts. Their choice is a matter of experience and thought, and subject to criteria which determine the adequacy or inadequacy of each of them.
Can egalitarianism be disrespectful?
In some social contexts strict egalitarianism is the very embodiment of respect. An example of such a context is a gathering of equal peers deliberating on a shared problem. Each is understood by the others to hold an opinion of equal validity to his own. Each peer is entitled the same level of attention, the same time to speak and to be heard out and to be believed and also to be questioned. Of course, each participant has a personal opinion regarding the rightness and wrongness of opinions stated, but any expectation that others will give one’s own opinion more weight than any another’s undermines the equal peer relationship. Let’s call this symmetrical egalitarianism.
In other social contexts, however, strict egalitarianism can be disrespectful. An example of this kind of context is a group of people gathered to discuss a specialized topic, where some members of the group have invested significant time, energy and resources to continually improve the quality of their beliefs in this area, where other members have not made the same level investment. The former have worked to become authorities on the topic at hand and the latter have not. (Imagine an accomplished physicist in conversation with a group of less experienced scientists, or even scientists who are accomplished in fields outside the one being discussed). In such situations, giving equal weight to each person’s opinion would insult the authority’s hard-won expertise. For one reason or another his work has failed to accomplish its goal of improving his understanding — that is, elevating his initial opinion to informed belief, reflective practice, cultivated knowledge and refined judgment.
Why would an expert’s expertise be denied or ignored? Perhaps his field is not one where genuine knowledge is possible, and can never be more than a matter of opinion, where one person’s opinion is as good as another’s no matter how much work is invested in cultivating knowledge. Or perhaps the alleged expert has taken a bad approach, and has wasted years of effort following the wrong path further from the truth. Or perhaps the would-be expert has some personal flaw or limitation that has prevented him from acquiring real knowledge or has led him to aquire delusional opinions that only appear to him to be knowledge. Or perhaps the laypeople are convinced that genuine knowledge in the field necessarily and automatically leads an expert to an egaliarian attitude toward his own opinion: the superiority of his view consists in its paradoxical refusal to regard itself as superior, and any hint of judgment is a symptom of inferior knowledge.
This latter view actually has some validity. The world is stuffed with authoritarian experts who flash their credentials and demand submission to their authority. This ought to be resisted. No expert should require non-experts to obey without being persuaded by reason. This is non-egaliarian tyranny of experts.
But what true experts ask for is not unconditional obedience or uncritical belief. What they ask for from others is patience and effort The expert needs time not only to express their views, but also to impart enough expertise that others have the context needed to understand and fairly assess the expert’s ideas. Let’s call this asymmertical egalitarianism — an egalitarianism that acknowledges equality of reason and judgment, but also acknowledges the realities of expertise and permits it conditions needed to be heard and understood.
It is these conditions that symmetrical egalitarianism denies. From the point of view of symmetrical egalitarianism, the time and attention an expert requires to convey the background of his factual opinions is experienced as an unfair domination of a conversation. Each person is doled out the same quantity of time as everyone else, and this self-regarded expert is trying to take more than his share.
But from the point of view of expertise, this symmetry creates an unfair asymmetry of means to convey meaning. The laypeople are given what they need to fully communicate their views, but experts — the very ones best informed on the topic at hand — are forced to provide their views without context, which means their views will seem obscure, pedantic or nonsensical compared to the down-to-earth practicality and plain speech of the regular guy, or they try to provide context and get cut off before their point is made. Symmetrical egalitarianism guarantees the common sense status quo view always prevails, and those in the room with genuinely unique and deeply considered views will be subjected to a Bed of Procrustes truncation that allows them to talk but denies them the means to be understood.
*
Incidentally, this symmetrical and asymmetrical egalitarian concept can be applied to other fields. For instance, in education symmetries of fairness are sometimes established on the basis of allocated resources, the right to reach some standard level of acheivement or to maintain some pace of improvement. These symmetries are often enforced at the expense of subtler forms of fairness, such as the ability to actualize one’s own potential. Obviously, this creates deep problems, including problems of measurement and objectivity, but the depth of such problems does not warrant ignoring these problems as essentially insoluble, or worse (and most commonly) denying the problem’s existence altogether.