Category Archives: Philosophy

My (mis)use of the term angst

Heidegger saw angst as the response of a being (Dasein) facing the certainty of death. I don’t know if Heidegger would have agreed with how I’ve extended his concept of angst. I understand all being as composite. Being is composed of beings, and it is the composing of being. Any being at any scale facing its demise experiences angst, and this demise does not have any necessary connection to biological death.

Through this interpretation of angst I connect Heidegger to Kuhn. The resistence of normal science to revolutionary science is not hatred of the novel, but the destruction to the familiar required to order the unfamiliar within a new scientific paradigm. I extend this also to practical paradigms (the breaking of habits) and poetic paradigms (the changing of spiritual vision or cultural tastes).

This is one of those intellectual moves (or “dances”) I half picked up, half invented and started using without explicitly acknowledging the modifications I made.

Involvement and alienation

Involvement (being involved) – ORIGIN late Middle English (in the senses  of enfold and entangle): from Latin involvere, from in– ‘into’ + volvere ‘to roll.’

Responsibility (being responsible) – ORIGIN late 16th cent. in the sense of answering to, corresponding: from obsolete French, from Latin respons– ‘answered, offered in return,’ from the verb respondere.

Absolution (being absolved) – ORIGIN late Middle English : from Latin absolvere ‘set free, acquit,’ from ab– ‘from’ + solvere ‘loosen.’

Alienation (being made an alien) – ORIGIN Middle English : via Old French from Latin alienus ‘belonging to another,’ from alius ‘other.’
*

It is interesting to notice where in society a particular person sees himself as a participant in something to which he belongs versus where he sees himself acted upon by something apart from themselves (to slightly misuse Heidegger’s term, a “They”).

*

It seems likely that what defines a person’s political stance on the legitimacy of economic versus political power to regulate collective action is his sense of competence or incompetence (and vulnerability) in the respective social sphere. A person is likely to take responsibility where he is confident of his abilities and to feel alienated where he lacks confidence. A crude typology, based on this framing:

  • Economic monist: The person who regards himself as a participant in economic life (an employee or employer) but views political organization (government) as something alien which corrupts, oppresses and/or impinges.
  • Political monist: The person who regards himself as a participant in political life (a citizen or activist, working at anything from the neighborhood to international scale) but views economic organization (often the corporation) as something alien which corrupts, oppresses and/or impinges.
  • Social nihilist: The person who regards himself as an individual trying to live his own life with minimal economic and political impingement.
  • Social pluralist: The person regards himself as a community leader, working politically and economically to control the condition of his own, his family’s and his community’s life.

*

There are other examples of alienation. There are those who feel that history goes on entirely outside of themselves. There are also those who believe God is a being who exists outside of apart from themselves. Finally, some people think friend exists outside of and apart from themselves.

Relating to the past

I make a distinction between remembering, recollecting and recalling. Remembering is reproducing on demand the content of memory. Recollecting is assembling disconnected memories into something coherent. Recalling is evoking immemorable meaning and filling the hollowness of memory.

*

Yin is remembered and recollected. Yang remembers, recollects memories and recalls.

*

Reading is to remember.

Comprehension is to recollect.

Hermeneutics is to recall.

*

Facts are remembered.

Arguments are comprehended.

Meaning is understood.

Edwin Muir – “The Animals”

They do not live in the world,
Are not in time and space.
From birth to death hurled
No word do they have, not one
To plant a foot upon,
Were never in any place.

For with names the world was called
Out of the empty air,
With names was built and walled,
Line and circle and square,
Dust and emerald;
Snatched from deceiving death
By the articulate breath.

But these have never trod
Twice the familiar track,
Never never turned back
Into the memoried day.
All is new and near
In the unchanging Here
Of the fifth great day of God,
That shall remain the same,
Never shall pass away.

On the sixth day we came.

Edwin Muir

More Dewey

Also from Freedom and Culture:

The greatest practical inconsistency that would be revealed by searching our own habitual attitudes is probably one between the democratic method of forming opinions in political matters and the methods in common use in forming beliefs in other subjects. In theory, the democratic method is persuasion through public discussion carried on not only in legislative halls but in the press, private conversations and public assemblies. The substitution of ballots for bullets, of the right to vote for the lash, is an expression of the will to substitute the method of discussion for the method of coercion. With all its defects and partialities in determination of political decisions, it has worked to keep factional disputes within bounds, to an extent that was incredible a century or more ago. While Carlyle could bring his gift of satire into play in ridiculing the notion that men by talking to and at each other in an assembly hall can settle what is true in social affairs any more than they can settle what is true in the multiplication table, he failed to see that if men had been using clubs to maim and kill one another to decide the product of 7 times 7, there would have been sound reasons for appealing to discussion and persuasion even in the latter case. The fundamental reply is that social “truths” are so unlike mathematical truths that unanimity of uniform belief is possible in respect to the former only when a dictator has the power to tell others what they must believe — or profess they believe. The adjustment of interests demands that diverse interests have a chance to articulate themselves.

The real trouble is that there is an intrinsic split in our habitual attitudes when we profess to depend upon discussion and persuasion in politics and then systematically depend upon other methods in reaching conclusions in matters of morals and religion, or in anything where we depend upon a person or group possessed of “authority.” We do not have to go to theological matters to find examples. In homes and in schools, the places where the essentials of character are supposed to be formed, the usual procedure is settlement of issues, intellectual and moral, by appeal to the “authority” of parent, teacher, or textbook. Dispositions formed under such conditions are so inconsistent with the democratic method that in a crisis they may be aroused to act in positively anti-democratic ways for anti-democratic ends; just as resort to coercive force and suppression of civil liberties are readily palliated in nominally democratic communities when the cry is raised that “law and order” are threatened.

 

Willing vs projecting

Dewey (from Freedom and Culture):

The present predicament may be stated as follows: Democracy does involve a belief that political institutions and law be such as to take fundamental account of human nature. They must give it freer play than any non-democratic institutions. At the same time, the theory, legalistic and moralistic, about human nature that has been used to expound and justify this reliance upon human nature has proved inadequate. Upon the legal and political side, during the nineteenth century it was progressively overloaded with ideas and practices which have more to do with business carried on for profit than with democracy. On the moralistic side, it has tended to substitute emotional exhortation to act in accord with the Golden Rule for the discipline and the control afforded by incorporation of democratic ideals into all the relations of life. Because of lack of an adequate theory of human nature in its relations to democracy, attachment to democratic ends and methods has tended to become a matter of tradition and habit — an excellent thing as far as it goes, but when it becomes routine is easily undermined when change of conditions changes other habits.

Were I to say that democracy needs a new psychology of human nature, one adequate to the heavy demands put upon it by foreign and domestic conditions, I might be taken to utter an academic irrelevancy. But if the remark is understood to mean that democracy has always been allied with humanism, with faith in the potentialities of human nature, and that the present need is vigorous reassertion of this faith, developed in relevant ideas and manifested in practical attitudes, it but continues the American tradition. For belief in the “common man” has no significance save as an expression of belief in the intimate and vital connection of democracy and human nature.

We cannot continue the idea that human nature when left to itself, when freed from external arbitrary restrictions, will tend to the production of democratic institutions that work successfully. We have now to state the issue from the other side. We have to see that democracy means the belief that humanistic culture should prevail; we should be frank and open in our recognition that the proposition is a moral one — like any idea that concerns what should be.

Strange as it seems to us, democracy is challenged by totalitarian states of the Fascist variety on moral grounds just as it is challenged by totalitarianisms of the left on economic grounds. We may be able to defend democracy on the latter score, as far as comparative conditions are involved, since up to the present at least the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has not “caught up” with us, much less “surpassed” us, in material affairs. But defense against the other type of totalitarianism (and perhaps in the end against also the Marxist type) requires a positive and courageous constructive awakening to the significance of faith in human nature for development of every phase of our culture:science, art, education, morals and religion, as well as politics and economics. No matter how uniform and constant human nature is in the abstract, the conditions within which and upon which it operates have changed so greatly since political democracy was established among us, that democracy cannot now depend upon or be expressed in political institutions alone. We cannot even be certain that they and their legal accompaniments are actually democratic at the present time — for democracy is expressed in the attitudes of human beings and is measured by consequences produced in their lives.

 *

Nietzsche:

“Whoever does not know how to lay his will into things, at least lays some meaning into them: that means, he has the faith that they already obey a will (principle of ‘faith’).”

 *

1) Is ethics (as a branch of philosophy) the practice of learning how to lay one’s will into things?

2) I still consider my typology of behavioral disciplines (morals, moralism, ethics and behavior aesthetics) valid, but my (ethical?) attitude toward them may be shifting.

*

(Much of what I’ve written below is based on second-hand information on Leo Strauss, and it very well might be wrong. I’ve only read one essay by Leo Strauss, and it was a non-political one. It was actually pretty amazing.)

As I understand it, the fundamental conflict between the Straussians (the school of philosophy upon which Neoconservatism was founded) and the Pragmatists (the school of philosophy upon which Progressivism appears to have been founded) boils down to attitudes toward Natural Rights, the conception of human rights that sees them as metaphysically belonging to human nature within the natural order in general.

I believe both sides agree that Natural Right is a mythical feature within American culture, but they disagree on the practical value of the belief. My understanding is that the Straussians believe the myth is a necessary one, required for the continuance of America as we know it, culturally and politically, because the masses require a metaphysical externalization of morality in order to accept it as valid.

The Pragmatists on the other hand consider the belief an obsolete superstition that must be overcome and replaced with a truer and more resilient concept – that we choose to uphold democracy and freedom simply because we – Americans, in particular – experience it as good and worth preserving for its intrinsic value and the intrinsic value of the constellation of values associated with it. This value needs no further metaphysical validation.

A very important consequence of belief in natural rights is the belief that democracy is simply what happens when obstacles to its realization are removed. When democracy is offered, human nature kicks in and the choice is automatic. The Pragmatist believes that democratic values are cultural, and even the desire for democracy must be cultivated. Further, the continuance of democracy depends not only on the absence of tyrants and democratic political mechanisms and institutions, but most of all on cultivation of democratic attitudes and skills.

What is unnerving about the Straussians is their (reputed) willingness to propagate myths in which they do not themselves believe (or to put it more nicely, telling “noble lies”). Which of the Neoconservatives were actually Straussians, speaking disingenuously (nobly lying) about Freedom, and which Neoconservatives were noble dupes of Straussians? Which Republicans really believed Democracy would be embraced in the Middle East despite the nonexistence of a supporting cultural context, and what were the ones who knew better trying to accomplish over there – or over here?

I’m strongly considering reading Strauss’s Natural Right and History to see if I have Strauss anywhere close to right.

 

Why design testing encourages invention

The importance of judgment in design (as opposed to art) is secondary to inventiveness. That does not mean judgment is unimportant, but that when objective tests of a design’s functionality are available the importance of knowing what will and won’t work is partially supplanted by the testing. When testing is available the role of judgment is to eliminate obviously nonviable designs and to choose among the viable candidates the design most likely to test well. But neither native judgment nor testing is generative. The scope of testable possibilities is determined by the inventiveness of a designer.

*

Especially in competitive situations, where solidly usable and useful options already exist for users, and some other differentiating advantage is necessary, a designer capable of imagining many coherent approaches that possess the right qualities (qualities that intersect with the spirit of the brand and the desires of the target users) is more valuable than one who generates reliable, unimaginative ones. The availability of testing means designers are free to try new approaches at a much lower risk than full implementation trial-and-error.

In fact, designers are now not only free but increasingly obligated to take risky new approaches, precisely because the availability of testing has made good usefulness and usability the norm. The first two-dimensions of experience, which are easily attainable through method, are now just table stakes. Knowledge of methodology is no longer enough. Inventiveness supplies the differentiating third dimension of on-brand desirability, and that is a matter of talent as well as technique. To be competitive in the new environment a designer must know how to generate useful and usable experiences that are also both desirable and deeply on-brand. It is easy to be superficially on brand, by looking cool/professional/appealing within the bounds of graphic standards. To be deeply, behaviorally on brand means to execute every apparent and behavioral detail with precisely the right style. It isn’t enough to dress the part of on-brand desirability, or even just to act it. The design must be the brand authentically, and in positive relationship with the user.

*

Culturally, the availability of usability testing is great news for designers. If you were to survey designers on the most and least pleasant aspects of their job, ideation would certainly fall on the “most pleasant” end of the spectrum and arguing with clients over matters of judgment would land at the extreme of “least pleasant”. Testing can foster a spirit of collaboration, where the ultimate questions of functionality are settled in laboratory experiments, as opposed to in conference room conflicts where in reality the designer is close to powerless. The question is no longer “which of us is more qualified to know what will work?” or “which of us is the ultimate decider?” but rather, “which design should we try first?” The latter is a much more enjoyable conversation.

This pertains not only to usability. Usefulness is even more easily tested. Desirability and conformity to brand are slightly more difficult to test, but not excessively difficult.

Triad: What, How, Why

The traditional Eastern triad of earth, man, heaven can be translated to what, how, and why, or object, verb, and subject (taken primarily as as the source of valuation).

The trigrams describe varying states (yang, changing yang, yin, changing yin) each stratum (or yao, in the language of trigrams) can take which determines the quality of a given situation. A situation comprises a subject situated amidst objects of varying relationship to the subject. The state of each stratum can be unitary or fragmentary (unitary corresponding to yang, disintegrating/diverging corresponding to changing yang, fragmentary corresponding to yin, integrating/converging corresponding to changing yin).

The value of the trigrams lies in the fact that the situations are intrinsically gestalts that are not easy to analyze, because each part of the situation modifies the whole in non-obvious ways. The modification seems to be caused by what is modified, where what is modified generally reflects a change originating elsewhere. For instance, if the meaning of a situation (heaven/why/subject) is disintegrating, this change may be felt most distinctly as doubts around the practical response (man/how/verb) and the objects concerned (earth/what/object) in the form of change in relevance and relation among the entities involved in the situation. Conversely, if heaven is integrating the change may manifest as emerging practical resolve and as clarity in regard to the relevant entities and how they connect. (I may write more on this later.)

Another thing I want to record before I forget: the permutations of yin and yang in each yao create situational gestalts, each with distinct character. The “Securing Reality” post I made last month was a first attempt to summarize those situational gestalts.

World nexus

 The experiencing self is the nexus of the world – not necessarily the world itself, nor the world’s origin, nor the world’s destiny. It is, however, necessarily the world’s nexus, whatever else it may be. That “whatever else” in connection with the experiencing self is the genetic kernel of the self’s metaphysics and morality.

Skin

For sure, no totality is as total as it self-evidently appears; every totality is suspended in an exceeding infinity. But does it automatically follow from this fact that morality demands constant and infinitely sensitive awareness of infinity, particularly in our interactions with others? Despite the fact that refusal to sympathize with others is a universal component of evil, does that mean that refusal to sympathize is essentially evil?

Perhaps sometimes we totalize our world for good reason. (Just as sometimes the infinite must break through to us.)

*

Next time you see one of those cars plastered with dozens of bumper stickers, look for the one that says “Minds are like parachutes – they only function when open.”

If you get a chance to talk to the driver ask her what parachute packs and ripcords are for. Or see if she’s open to performing an experimental jump with an unpacked parachute.

*

Every complex living thing has a membrane which selectively admits and rejects what is foreign.

The best lack all conviction

So far in Dewey I’ve seen no recognition of the need to harmonize and focus the disparate elements of subjectivity. Without this harmony and focus, no individual or collectivity can care enough to take responsibility for itself, much less the conditions that influence it. This harmony and focus very well might involve simplification and even a certain degree of (poetic) falsification. This would be a slippery slope if it weren’t for the fact that the surface slips in both directions: toward unreality on one side and apathy on the other. In this time we are threatened by both at once.

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

Surely some revelation is at hand;
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
Troubles my sight; somewhere in sands of the desert
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it
Reel shadows of indignant desert birds.
The darkness drops again; but now I know
That twenty centuries of stony sleep
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?

– W. B. Yeats

Plurad

I don’t expect anyone to read much of this:

If monism is founded on (in) a monad, what is pluralism founded on? A “plurad”? A plurad is the background of monads; and each monad is self-evidently self-grounded. A monad’s derivation from its plurad is existentially known only through the experience of change across monistic foundings. For a minute, I thought the plurad would be synonymous with the Tao, but the plurad might be just another monad.

A thinker tends to transpose the Transcendent into the terms of his current ontology. The meaning of the Transcendent for me currently is based on a sort of calculus of perspective. I look at the trajectory of the kinds of change I apperceptively observe in my observations as I iteratively blow up and reconstitute my understanding of being, and that trajctory suggests a negatively-defined point of approach. I’m on the lookout for ontological transpositions, and I don’t trust myself one bit to avoid them. There’s no way to positively expect the unexpected, so I try to acknowledge the utter futility of attempting to settle it, and I try to allow my spiritual processes to run their course by their own principles and not impose standards on where they take me. I’m not sure if that’s a sustainable way to live, though. The moral value of this way of living is not clear. The point of it is also not clear. I’ll probably have to stop at some point to avoid implosion or terrible social consequences, or maybe I’ll stop on my own from exhaustion.

(I googled “plurad” to see whether it has been used as a word, and I found this.)

Buddhism and phenomenology

According to Nyanaponika Thera in his book Abhidamma Studies, The Abhidhamma, the fundamental Buddhist metaphysical treatise, is primarily phenomenological. One exception to the phenomenological approach is the existence of the negatively defined Nibbana (the Pali/Theravada word for Nirvana). When presented this way Nibanna appears to be another name for the Tao. Nibanna is “not included” within conditioned existence, the subject of the work.

Morality and ontology

An ontology can be arrested or preserved by a number of attitudes. A provisional list:

  • Reductionism: treating one kind of being as strictly derived from another unlike kind of being.
  • Mysticism: classifying what is outside of known being as unknowable in principle.
  • Romanticism: assigning qualities of being to what is outside of known being.
  • Ideology: reflexively invalidating what is unknowable within one’s current ontology.
  • Decadence: refusing to clarify one’s thoughts enough to distinguish and relate various kinds of being.
  • Ignorance: accepting the self-evident sufficiency of one’s ontology in the absence of evident insufficiency

*

I’ve thought of philosophy as a quest for authentically innocent blissful ignorance. Innocent means one has sincerely attempted to overcome reductionism, mysticism, romanticism, ideology, decadence and ignorance… and failed so completely he cannot avoid feeling he has succeeded.

(Can a person feel he has succeeded if people he respects remain unpersuaded?)

*

A question I have not asked seriously enough: What is the moral value of arresting or preserving an ontology? When is it right or wrong to arrest or preserve an ontology, and what is the standard and ground of this rightness or wrongness?

*

Note: According to my definition of reductionism, strong holism (as I understand it) is as much a form of reductionism as atomism, because strong holism reduces parts to mere articulations from wholes and denies the reality of a part’s individual being.

Ways to see a self

Self as individual seer.

Self as a seen individual.

Self as participatory seer, which means that the shared seeing subjectivity is as much a concern as the seen object.

Self as seen as belonging to a particular whole: a member of a particular type.

*

An account can be taken sequentially: each part evaluated in turn, admitted or rejected.

An account can be taken whole: all parts admitted, and evaluated in relation to one another.

Before an account is fully understood, in what state is the understanding?

*

I watched two girls learn to speak. They learned to imitate tone, the vocabulary was secondary – at first the words were vehicles for tone, then the meanings of words developed out of the babble.

I’m told I didn’t speak at all until I could form sentences out of defined words.

*

I like to watch women talking in restaurants, leaning toward one another, looking at each other, gesturing and mirroring gestures.

*

Years ago when I was learning to meditate I thought I heard a dim phonemical flux playing in the back of my mind. A phoneme resembling a word reminded me of a word and caused an idea to crystalise and pop into my head. It’s hard to know if that happened or if it was like a dream making retroactive sense in semifalsified recollection.

The anxiety of influence

I’m not sure when I’ll get around to reading it, but I just ordered The Anxiety of Influence by Harold Bloom.

The premise of the book sounds very similar to Borges’s “Kafka and His Precursors”.

*

The people I know who are most preoccupied with fending off influence and protecting their originality are the ones who haven’t even begun to liberate themselves from the influence of culture. These people tend to rethink what’s been well-thought and in fact, thought all the way through and out again by men who have accepted the humiliation of being taught.

The irony of intellectual pride is that it tends to make a thinker complacent and less likely to work and win less obvious knowledge. The disinclination to acknowledge one’s intellectual debt to one’s culture is the arrogance of youth. The extreme and uncritical valuation of originality of thought which makes the youth prefer to overlook his debt to the past is one of the more conspicuous symptoms of this debt.

Arrogance: ORIGIN late Middle English : via Old French from Latin arrogant– ‘claiming for oneself,’ from the verb arrogare.