Category Archives: Philosophy

Honor and narcissism, complementary androgynies

Honor and narcissism are two forms of androgyny, meaning that self knows itself both as essence (seer) and appearance (seen), but their orientations are different. Honor is extraverted androgyny and narcissism is introverted androgyny. Honor cultivates essence and appearance together in order to interface more fully with an enclosing (that is, transcendent) world populated with seeing entities who are seen (what Levinas calls “the face”). Narcissism cultivates essence and appearance together in order to create a a self-enjoying short circuit. The narcissist maintains conditions for the self enjoyment, both through behavioral aesthetics (self-pleasing actions) and ethics (doing what is necessary for the practical upkeep of the self-pleasing life). Honor also engages in behavioral aesthetics and ethics, but in addition is moral, meaning that it recognizes the mystery of others – a binding mystery.

(As I’ve said before, the borderline personality experiences self solely as seen, pure yin; and the autistic personality experiences self solely as seeing, pure yang. Existentialism is artificial autism.)

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Honor cultivates appearance for the seeing of others beyond self, in order to approach them as fellow-seers who see differently and who can potentially bring one another to different seeing together: an opening to agreement. Honor recognizes the relevance of the radically other, which is not at all the same as automatically accepting its legitimacy.

Narcissism cultivates essence and appearance together in order to enjoy the seeing and being seen of self, and the seeing of others is welcomed only as a reflection of this seeing and being-seen of self: a closing off of disagreement. Narcissism rejects what is radically other, sometimes aggressively, but often serenely, and often in an act of extravagant tolerance, as acceptance of the fact of otherness as permanently and unapproachably beyond its participation. Much mysticism is narcissism: otherness is a sparkling backdrop to one’s own serene soliptic self-orbit, something to gape at or to pray to, but nothing that could break or burn or blow someone to pieces – nor renew him. Those who want to be left the hell alone are attracted to this kind of vision of heaven.

Octavia, the spider-web city

“Thin Cities 5, Octavia”
From Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities

If you choose to believe me, good. Now I will tell how Octavia, the spider-web city, is made. There is a precipice between two steep mountains: the city is over the void, bound to the two crests with ropes and chains and catwalks. You walk on the little wooden ties, careful not to set your foot in the open spaces, or you cling to the hempen strands. Below there is nothing for hundreds and hundreds of feet: a few clouds glide past; farther down you can glimpse the chasm’s bed.

This is the foundation of the city: a net which serves as passage and as support. All the rest, instead of rising up, is hung below: rope ladders, hammocks, houses made like sacks, clothes hangers, terraces like gondolas, skins of water, gas jets, spits, baskets on strings, dumb-waiters, showers, trapezes and rings for children’s games, cable cars, chandeliers, pots with trailing plants.

Suspended over the abyss, the life of Octavia’s inhabitants is less uncertain than in other cities. They know the net will last only so long.

Moth and moon

Slowly the lamp is covered by moths until it is eclipsed and no longer attracts moths.

A mothy crust: a testimonial.

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Our world has one sun and one moon, roughly the same size in our sky, a German sky.

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We say “sun and moon” as if they were antitheses, like something and nothing, or subject and object, or good and evil.

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If the unknown were as resistant to esteem as it is to knowledge, this world would be very different. For one thing, there would be no religion. After all, there would be no poetry – but the loss of poetry goes unnoticed.

Words, stars and home

Out in the ocean with no land in sight a navigator looks up and takes readings of stars he knows by name, each set in its precise position within the constellations. The stars tell him where he is, where others have been, and where others are now.

In the town the people look up at the same stars but they see less than the the navigator. They are at home together under their roofs under the starry expanse.

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Free conversation is standing together on common ground, in common understanding, looking out upon the world.

Understanding of words can be the enjoyment of common ground. Or words can be a means to coming to common ground.

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Converse: ORIGIN late Middle English (in the sense [live among, be familiar with] ): from Old French converser, from Latin conversari ‘keep company (with),’ from con- ‘with’ + versare, frequentative of vertere ‘to turn.’

Conversing – Turning with another, toward the topic.

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“I will hear you out.”

“I will try to understand what you are saying.”

“I will try to understand the ground of what you are saying, because what is said is comprehensible only in reference to the ground from which it is said.”

“I will try to stand on your ground with you, with you in order to understand what you are saying, because an understanding must be arrived at, not comprehended from afar.”

“We should find common ground. That ground, once we find it, will lead back to where we stand now, what we cannot help but take for the destination.”

Dialogue of drawing

In college I spent hours drawing. I did not know how a drawing would turn out. As I drew I drew in response to the drawing-in-progress, which perpetually surprised me in a twofold way: 1) in how the drawing unfolded before me, and 2) in the responses the drawing drew from me. Part of what kept me absorbed in the drawing was suspense of the unfolding.

As long as I stayed absorbed in the drawing of the drawing I was absolutely surefooted. The times I lapsed into reflection on myself and my abilities and drew as “myself who is drawing” everything fell apart. Nothing interesting would happen, my fingers had to be told what to do, the drawing and the drawing were ruined together.

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The artifact of the drawing feeds into the craft of the drawing, which produces the artifact.

Craft -> artifact -> craft -> artifact …

In conversation, what is heard feeds into what is said which produces what is heard.

Saying -> said -> saying -> said …

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Art creates itself through the artist. Conversation has itself through the interlocutors.

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Absorption is bliss. Craft is bliss.

Questioning anamnesis

Reading on in Levinas’s Totality and Infinity:

We must now indicate the terms which will state the deformalization or the concretization of the idea of infinity, this apparently wholly empty notion. The infinite in the finite, the more in the less, which is accomplished by the idea of Infinity, is produced as Desire – not a Desire that the possession of the Desirable slakes, but the Desire for the Infinite which the desirable arouses rather than satisfies. A Desire perfectly disinterested – goodness. But Desire and goodness concretely presuppose a relationship in which the Desirable arrests the “negativity” of the I that holds sway in the Same – puts an end to power and emprise. This is positively produced as the possession of a world I can bestow as a gift on the Other – that is, as a presence before a face. For the presence before a face, my orientation toward the Other, can lose the avidity proper to the gaze only by turning into generosity, incapable of approaching the other with empty hands. This relationship established over the things henceforth possibly common, that is, susceptible of being said, is the relationship of conversation. The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum – the adequate idea. It does not manifest itself by these qualities, but kathauto. It expresses itself. The face brings a notion of truth which, in contradistinction to contemporary ontology, is not the disclosure of an impersonal Neuter, but expression: the existent breaks through all the envelopings and generalities of Being to spread out in its “form” the totality of its “content,” finally abolishing the distinction between form and content. This is not achieved by some sort of modification of the knowledge that thematizes, but precisely by “thematization” turning into conversation. The condition for theoretical truth and error is the word of the other, his expression, which every lie already presupposes. But the first content of expression is the expression itself. To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain. In its non-violent transitivity the very epiphany of the face is produced. The Aristotelian analysis of the intellect, which discovers the agent intellect coming in by the gates, absolutely exterior, and yet constituting, nowise compromising, the sovereign activity of reason, already substitutes for maieutics a transitive action of the master, since reason, without abdicating, is found to be in a position to receive.

Finally, infinity, overflowing the idea of infinity, puts the spontaneous freedom within us into question. It commands and judges it and brings it to its truth. The analysis of the idea of Infinity, to which we gain access only starting from an I, will be terminated with the surpassing of the subjective.

“Metaphysics Precedes Ontology”

If you’re curious about what’s wrong with me here’s a clue: I’ve been struggling with the same passage from Levinas’s Totality and Infinity since the middle of last week.

A sample:

The primacy of ontology for Heidegger’ does not rest on the truism: “to know an existent it is necessary to have comprehended the Being of existents. ” To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates justice to freedom. If freedom denotes the mode of remaining the same in the midst of the other, knowledge, where an existent is given by interposition of impersonal Being, contains the ultimate sense of freedom. It would be opposed to justice, which involves obligations with regard to an existent that refuses to give itself, the Other, who in this sense would be an existent par excellence. In subordinating every relation with existents to the relation with Being the Heideggerian ontology affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics. To be sure, the freedom involved in the essence of truth is not for Heidegger a principle of free will. Freedom comes from an obedience to Being: it is not man who possesses freedom; it is freedom that possesses man. But the dialectic which thus reconciles freedom and obedience in the concept of truth presupposes the primacy of the same, which marks the direction of and defines the whole of Western philosophy.

The relation with Being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent in order to comprehend or grasp it. It is hence not a relation with the other as such but the reduction of the other to the same. Such is the definition of freedom: to maintain oneself against the other, despite every relation with the other to ensure the autarchy of an I. Thematization and conceptualization, which moreover are inseparable, are not peace with the other but suppression or possession of the other.

A philosophy of power, ontology is, as first philosophy which does not call into question the same, a philosophy of injustice. Even though it opposes the technological passion issued forth from the forgetting of Being hidden by existents, Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in general, remains under obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny. Tyranny is not the pure and simple extension of technology to reified men. Its origin lies back in the pagan “moods,” in the enrootedness in the earth, in the adoration that enslaved men can devote to their masters. Being before the existent, ontology before metaphysics, is freedom (be it the freedom of theory) before justice. It is a movement within the same before obligation to the other.

The terms must be reversed. For the philosophical tradition the conflicts between the same and the other are resolved by theory whereby the other is reduced to the same — or, concretely, by the community of the State, where beneath anonymous power, though it be intelligible, the I rediscovers war in the tyrannic oppression it undergoes from the totality. Ethics, where the same takes the irreducible Other into account, would belong to opinion. The effort of this book is directed toward apperceiving in discourse a non-allergic relation with alterity, toward apperceiving Desire – where power, by essence murderous of the other, becomes, faced with the other and “against all good sense,” the impossibility of murder, the consideration of the other, or justice. Concretely our effort consists in maintaining, within anonymous community, the society of the I with the Other – language and goodness. This relation is not pre-philosophical, for it does not do violence to the I, is not imposed upon it brutally from the outside, despite itself, or unbeknown to it, as an opinion; more exactly, it is imposed upon the I beyond all violence by a violence that calls it entirely into question. The ethical relation, opposed to first philosophy which identifies freedom and power, is not contrary to truth; it goes unto being in its absolute exteriority, and accomplishes the very intention that animates the movement unto truth.

The relationship with a being infinitely distant, that is, overflowing its idea, is such that its authority as an existent is already invoked in every question we could raise concerning the meaning of its Being. One does not question oneself concerning him; one questions him. Always he faces.

Moral anxieties

Some catch-all mystical categories seal what is beyond I in glass, where it glows silently and harmlessly and provides evocative mood-lighting to an undisturbed world.

In regard to one another, we are beyond.

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It is hard to tell if hostility to God is what makes us hostile to one another, or hostility to one another is what makes us hostile to God. Maybe one day when my theology liberates itself from liberalism I’ll see a difference. Meanwhile, I am going to look for a conservative who has come even that far. (First up: Frithjof Schuon.)

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I am beginning to suspect that “overcoming metaphysics” is a euphemism for solipsism.

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It is possible to acknowledge the existence of the metaphysical and even to orient one’s life by the metaphysical while remaining a solipsist in practice.

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When I am offended by someone invariably an examination of that offense leads me back to where I have committed that same offense against another.

Four types of behavioral disciplines

Four types of behavioral disciplines: moralism, behavioral aesthetics, ethics, morality.

  1. Moralism is behavior disciplined to conformity with codified behavioral standards. Moralism is rational.
  2. Behavioral aesthetics is behavior disciplined to satisfy one’s own spontaneous sense of goodness and rightness. Behavioral aesthetics can be original or derived, and it can have an introverted and/or extraverted character. On this basis, it would be possible to divide behavioral aesthetics into subtypes, but here what defines behavioral aesthetics is that the behavior is a thing to be experienced and judged on the qualities of the experience. (Obviously, but for the sake of parallelism) behavioral aesthetics is aesthetic.
  3. Ethics is behavior disciplined for the purpose of preserving conditions that sustain and give constancy to one’s own existence. Ethics is practical.
  4. Morality is behavior disciplined for the purpose of reconciliation with being that transcends one’s own existence. Morality is metaphysical.

Culture requires the coordination of all four types of behavioral disciplines.

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The big question of morality: how can something exist to a mind, when that something stands beyond its existence (including its experience of existence)?

It is possible to reduce the exophanic to mere experience: an experience of the transcendent announcing itself, while requiring nothing beyond the acknowledgment of beyondness. Are there other responses to the exophanic that could reveal the transcendent existence that announces itself through the exophanic experience?

It is possible to understand pain as an exophanic reflection in events and things, but it is also possible to understand the same pain as caused by those events and things.

Anatomy of a perspective

Perspectivism begins with the idea that seeing involves both a seeing subject and a seen object. Nothing is seen apart from the seer – you – and that you, the seer, always necessarily see from a position relative to what is seen.

The position one takes relative to what is seen affects the line of sight of what is seen (the angle of approach), what is seen as immediate and what is seen as remote (the relevance of what is seen), and also what is not seen (the horizon of the perspective).

A note on angle of approach: this is the structured openness of the perspective, or the way particulars organize themselves within the whole. Angle of approach manifests most obviously in the formulation of explicit questions, but more often it manifests as implicit expectations one brings to a new understanding.

This leads to one other very important point. We all know the mind is wonderfully equipped to recognize what it expects when encountering the unexpected. That recognition can be perfectly innocent, unconscious and stupid… or it can be willfully imposed… or brittle and irritable… or semi-fictional… or it can become violent toward whatever threatens the apparent absolute fixity of a perspective, especially a perspective held for a long time – for so long that it has forgotten that it is not reality itself.

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The Buddhists teach that gods are mortal but they live for so long they forget their mortality, and die horrible, violent deaths.

“It takes a long time / but god dies, too / but not before he’ll stick it to you.”

(Please don’t be offended by the notion of God dying. We know God only by way of a god who can die, and as far as we humble humans are concerned they are one and the same.)

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The fundamental task of socialization is convincing a child, born into the center of the world, seeing the entire world arrayed around his centrality, and never for a moment seeing it otherwise, that he is not the center of the world. There is nothing more counter-intuitive. No wonder this lesson is learned more often unsoundly than it is soundly.

Not the center of the universe… how? Does this mean I ought to take myself for one of these other things I see around me, like a tree or a computer or a person or a stone? Am I actually an object who sees objects? Is my consciousness is a quality added to or emerging from my objecthood? Some are only able to reconcile their world-centeredness and the array of objects that constitute their world in this way, and all that remains is to accept this perspective or reject it.

From this perspective there are two fundamental attitudes one can take: accept the primacy of the subject who sees objects (what the Chinese called “the ten-thousand things”) or accept the primacy of the objects, one of which mysteriously possesses the quality of subjectivity, the capacity to see as well as being seen. From within the perspective of subject-object, this constitutes the limit of perspectives, but this itself is a product of perspective itself: the horizon of the perspective.

Now, ask yourself honestly: do I actually know any alternative to these two attitudes toward the world? If not, what attitude do you take toward the possibility that there are possibilities of which you cannot conceive? And rather than answer that question, now pay attention to how you feel. Do you feel irritation, impatience, a very strong desire to think about something else? Do you suddenly remember you have other things you need to do right now? When’s the last time you checked your email? Maybe you should return to this later. This is how perspectives protect themselves: infinite postponement by choreographed justifications and distractions. (“Oh, Martha…”)

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To engage in hermeneutics is to look for all those devices that help us close understanding prematurely and to mistake perspectives which stand beyond ours as standing within ours. Hermeneutics knows understanding not as facts, but navigation by facts (using facts as a navigator uses stars) to the vantage of a fellow seer, from which/whom the facts fall into order. To be able to explain the seeing of an other corresponds to empathy. Hermeneutics prior to Gadamer (at least according to Gadamer) was strictly empathetic in form. Starting with Gadamer hermeneutics became the practice of finding and seeing with.

Permanent, futile, faithful pursuit

Your desire must be disciplined, / And what you want to happen / In time, sacrificed.

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Satiation of longing is the desire we must sacrifice.

I as an individual – I as one of we – we as community – we as the entirety of humankind: We are essentially, eternally incomplete. Nothing can change it.

All we have is the permanent, futile, faithful pursuit of completion which is its own intrinsic reward.

Like every other cliche, that all-too-repeated zennism “the journey is the destination” is true.

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A surplus or a deficit placed next to infinity is revealed as two forms of incompletion.

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It is time to stop regarding the sense of incompleteness as a symptom of something gone wrong.

What has gone wrong is that view of incompleteness.

To believe in future satiety in completion is to succumb to romanticism, to immanentize the eschaton.

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Pain is one thing; how the pain is viewed is another.

Is there more suffering the pain of now or in the painful anticipation of future suffering?

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Or so it all seems from here.

Fully dimensional truth

I love the Jewish phenomenological philosophers. Their earnest truthfulness is only secondarily why I love them. What I love most is their vision of divinity within the inter-subjective. This could only have come out of a tradition who has known and overcome extremes of social vulnerability, and perhaps because of this origin the inter-subjective borders on a preoccupation, maybe even a distorting exaggeration. A more even balancing of the elements that constitute truth would not only be more true, it would also be a fuller realization of the Jewish ideal. It is possible that this adjustment, performed originally for the sake of respecting and recognizing other conceptions of truth, could reveal a broader, deeper, more ecumenical vision.

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What matters is not openness to any particular kind of truth but openness to reality in all its unexpected richness. Ideology can manifest in any number of forms, not only in the suppression of certain particular facts but also ontologically, by excluding or minimizing certain categories of being or experience from due consideration. For instance, a scientist can be non-ideological in regard to his scientific activity (capable of acknowledging and responding to experimental anomalies) while being a political or religious ideologue.

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There are cases where the horizon of a person’s perspective remains intact by virtue of never having been tested. Nobody is obligated to go out looking for a test, but at the same time the failure of the test is the refusal to accept the validity of the test when it comes to you. Ignorance has its own kind of innocence and guilt.

There it is

The essence of morality (in its relationship to phenomenological philosophy) from Levinas’s Totality and Infinity.

But the presentation and the development of the notions employed [in Totality and Infinity] owe everything to the phenomenological method. Intentional analysis is the search for the concrete. Notions held under the direct gaze of the thought that defines them are nevertheless, unbeknown to this naive thought, revealed to be implanted in horizons unsuspected by this thought; these horizons endow them with a meaning – such is the essential teaching of Husserl. What does it matter if in the Husserlian phenomenology taken literally these unsuspected horizons are in their turn interpreted as thoughts aiming at objects! What counts is the idea of the overflowing of objectifying thought by a forgotten experience from which it lives. The break-up of the formal structure of thought (the noema of a noesis) into events which this structure dissimulates, but which sustain it and restore its concrete significance, constitutes a deduction – necessary and yet non-analytical. …  The signification that, in the present work, phenomenological deduction shows to underlie the theoretical thought concerning being and the panoramic exposition of being itself is not irrational. The aspiration to radical exteriority, thus called metaphysical, the respect for this metaphysical exteriority which, above all, we must “let be,” constitutes truth. It animates this work and evinces its allegiance to the intellectualism of reason. But theoretical thought, guided by the ideal of objectivity, does not exhaust this aspiration; it remains this side of its ambitions. If, as this book will show, ethical relations are to lead transcendence to its term, this is because the essential of ethics is in its transcendent intention, and because not every transcendent intention has the noesis-noema structure.

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Disclaimer: I’ve been wrong about morality a hundred times, but here is where I am.

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The desire to not know another for the sake of preserving one’s own understanding totality… this is to wish to rule one’s own world instead of serving in the world we share, which is infinite and mysterious but nonetheless not remote. Not only is it not remote, it is infinitely present if we can resist closing it out and explaining it away. Why do we close out the shared world? Because confrontation of the infinite arouses dread. Anyone who seeks comfort from “spirituality” and will not cross over the dark stretches of anxiety and perplexity which ring each understanding totality is not after spirituality, but comforting fantasies and distractions.

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I do in fact have a work ethic, but essential to that ethic is distinguishing between my work and that work that needs to be done in doing my work.

Being social

I have to learn to live on terms with the social, as opposed to the inter-human, to use Buber’s incredibly valuable distinction. I’ve tried to avoid and hide from and otherwise escape the social. I tried to pull a fast one and conflate the inter-human for the authentically social. I’ve tried to morally deny it (the old bitching about the herd/masses/mob move) behaving as if the inter-human is Good and the social is Evil, despite my professed but imperfectly practiced anti-moralistic method. And of course, I couldn’t help but abuse personality type again (an old habit) and typologically excuse myself from the social.

Most of my worst anxieties center around this theme.

  1. I hate to address a group as a group, which means speaking formally as opposed to conversationally.
  2. I hate reciting anything I already know, as opposed to freshly re-discovering truth in the act of speech.
  3. I hate, hate, hate parties and large gatherings where inter-human relations are eclipsed by human-to-group interactions.
  4. I hate representing any institution in the role of a representative of the institution. I prefer to be an individual who believes in the institution and remains entirely an individual who shares his thoughts on that insititution.
  5. I’m getting pressure on every side, at home (to stop being a curmudgeonly hermit and to voluntarily leave the house on occasion) and at work (to step into a leadership role and also to give lots and lots of presentations in distant cities), and I hate the hell out of it all.

These hatreds and anxieties are so intensely unpleasant there’s no way they aren’t my next practical-philosophical problem.

This is going to suck and suck and suck and I hate it to death. Here we go.