Category Archives: Philosophy

Skepticism and probability

Some people, when faced with uncertainty, weigh all the factual and interpretive possibilities and respond to the one that seems most probable. Sometimes they’ll cycle through a whole series of possibilities, one at a time.

Others generate multiple possibilities, and weigh the degree of uncertainty of each, looking for overlap between the most plausible possibilities. They then respond practically to the whole probabilistic cloud as a single situation.

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The latter approach is optimal for hermeneutics, for concepting, for psychology, and for pretty much any situation involving extreme indeterminacy or doubt. There’s the facts and there’s the interpretive arrangements, and each modifies the other. Knowing how to dismantle an interpretation (which can look for all the world like reality itself) into bits of data and then to reassemble them into multiple divergent interpretations, when combined with an active imagination and a nuanced recall results in the capacity to generate a vast array of persuasive possibilities. Everything is left liquid to some degree. It’s a gift and a curse.

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For a skeptic, no knowledge is complete until it includes the meta-knowledge of ground of certainty. To lose track of this is to lose command of the knowledge.

Turn

The theme of “the turn” in my last post (“Wiki activity”) is probably due to the fact that I watched Into the Wild last night. As I’ve said before I experience this film as a philosophical tragedy – or maybe just plain old tragedy.

I keep wanting to relate this myth to Rilke’s “Orpheus. Eurydice. Hermes”. Is it a different kind of tragedy – perhaps a feminine analogue? – or is it the same tragedy seen from another perspective?

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Alaska, bears, salmon, cold, white, north, hyperboreans… tragedy.

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I’ve created a new theme (the third this morning) in my wiki: North.

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I wish now that I’d taken a picture of the stained-glass salmon I gave a friend of mine. All I have is the plan I used to build it.

Wiki activity

I indexed all the direct (and some indirect) references to Logos in my wiki.  (When prompted enter “generalad”.)

Then I indexed several key passages treating what I’ve called “solipse“, or what is traditionally called “spiritual childhood”, “idealism”, and “existentialism” – the dangerous temporary autism (a state in which a thinker needs parental guidance) through which all genuine philosophers seem inevitably to pass. I also included some other passages describing the “turn“, moving beyond solipse into encounter with the Other, or Thou.

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I opposed “solipse”, the philosopher’s autism, with “eclipse”, the complementary modern state (which corresponds with borderline disorder), a world founded on a materialist metaphysic, where self is nearly wholly determined by reflections of “itself” in the eyes of others. The universe is composed of objective entities, including the self who occurs within the universe. The turn is the discovery that idealism is not necessarily founded in the individual (or not solely in the individual), but rather in a culturally-sustained, but also culturally-active self, who is one scale in an infinite transcendent nesting of consciousness whose form or image is Logos. [I just happened upon a diagram I made during Christmas ’07 of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis of eclipse and solipse.]

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A simple definition of “metaphysics“: interpretation of phenomena which extends beyond the phenomenal. We do it constantly without noticing, for instance when we believe in past and future, or in space or material, or in the unconscious… The hardest metaphysical extension of all –  the riskiest, most vulnerable,  but most rewarding – is opening to the full belief in one another as true Other, as Thou: saying “Namaste” without reserve.

Nietzsche on anatta

Your world stands on your immediate experience in the same way that a tree stands on its trunk.

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From Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 54:

What, at bottom, is the whole of modern philosophy doing? Since Descartes – and indeed rather in spite of him than on the basis of his precedent – all philosophers have been making an assault on the ancient soul concept under the cloak of a critique of the subject-and-predicate concept – that is to say, an assault on the fundamental presupposition of Christian doctrine. Modern philosophy, as an epistemological skepticism, is, covertly or openly, anti-Christian: although, to speak to more refined ears, by no means anti-religious. For in the past one believed in “the soul” as one believed in grammar and the grammatical subject: one said “I” is the condition, “think” is the predicate and conditioned – thinking is an activity to which a subject must be thought of as cause. Then one tried with admirable artfulness and tenacity to fathom whether one could not get out of this net – whether the reverse was not perhaps true: “think” the condition, “I” conditioned; “I” thus being only a synthesis produced by thinking. Kant wanted fundamentally to prove that, starting from the subject, the subject could not be proved – nor could the object: the possibility of an apparent existence of the subject, that is to say of “the soul,” may not always have been remote from him, that idea which, as the philosophy of the Vedanta, has exerted immense influence on earth before.

(In a preceding passage Nietzsche distinguished between a Germanic “Northern” Christianity and a Mediterranean “Southern” Christianity. When reading Nietzsche, I try to keep his attitude toward surfaces in the front of my mind. Unlike things, opposite things are sealed into the same skin and taken for identical. Especially notice his designations for “Christ”. “The Redeemer” and “the Crucified” should never be taken for synonyms. The person designated by “the founder of Christianity” is ambiguous; the singular article is plainly ironic.)

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Extending this thought: the substance of thinking – the language, the metaphors, the methods, the sense of relevance – where does that originate? There is a sense in which all things are founded on the immediacy of phenomena, but the questions of what elements of the phenomenal life-world are taken up and structured, and how and for what purpose the structuring is attempted and accomplished leads off beyond both the immediacy of phenomena and the (apparent) immediacy of the ego. It is clear that our “individuality” is articulated from a culture who transcends us. This realization, if it persuades you, cannot leave your morality intact. It changes absolutely everything.

 

Acquiring a taste

One must learn to love. — This is our experience in music: we must first learn in general to hear, to hear fully, and to distinguish a theme or a melody, we have to isolate and limit it as a life by itself; then we need to exercise effort and good-will in order to endure it in spite of its strangeness, we need patience towards its aspect and expression, and indulgence towards what is odd in it–in the end there comes a moment when we are accustomed to it, when we expect it, when it dawns upon us that we should miss it if it were lacking; and then it goes on to exercise its spell and charm more and more, and does not cease until we have become its humble and enraptured lovers, who want it, and want it again, and ask for nothing better from the world. It is thus with us, however, not only in music: it is precisely thus that we have learned to love everything that we love. We are always finally recompensed for our good-will, our patience, reasonableness and gentleness towards what is unfamiliar, by the unfamiliar slowly throwing off its veil and presenting itself to us as a new, ineffable beauty–that is its thanks for our hospitality. He also who loves himself must have learned it in this way: there is no other way. Love also has to be learned.

(Nietzsche, The Gay Science)

Text and memory

The the word “text” comes from the Latin verb texere. The word “text” is a thread stretches back into Rome, and on further back to where our collective memory fails. Whenever we speak we knit distant, ancient places into ordinariness, and that is miraculous. We don’t need invisible forces to account for collective being.

The words around memory are beautiful if you look at them closely. “Remember”, “Recollect”, “Recall”. The Greek word “anamnesis”, to unforget, is an interesting word to think about. I like to think of unforgetting as reordering reality according to its experiential proximity, being faithful to what is, and to the truth of what is closest and what is further out. Forgetting is allowing distant derivations to conceal what is nearest and most immediate. Explanation is often forgetting.

Sometimes we think in order to forget, but sometimes we think in order to unforget. The test: when you are finished, can you stop thinking it and simply see it?

Two ways to say the same thing

Sometimes I think Charlie Kaufman is a better interpreter of Nietzsche than Walter Kaufmann:

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Exhibit A:

…Then, however, there happened that which in this astonishing long day was most astonishing: the ugliest man began once more and for the last time to gurgle and snort, and when he had at length found expression, behold! there sprang a question plump and plain out of his mouth, a good, deep, clear question, which moved the hearts of all who listened to him.

“My friends, all of you,” said the ugliest man, “what think ye? For the sake of this day — I am for the first time content to have lived my entire life.

And that I testify so much is still not enough for me. It is worthwhile living on the earth: one day, one festival… has taught me to love the earth.

‘Was that — life?’ will I say to death. ‘Well! Once more!’

My friends, what think ye? Will you not, like me, say to death: ‘Was that — life? …well! Once more!’ ” —

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Exhibit B:

Where it all goes

Idealism (the recognition that the seeming solidity of this world is entirely founded on geist – spirit, mind) seems at first to offer a sort of solipsistic refuge, a sort of artificial autism for those who have been hurt too much in their contact with others. But if you are existentially scrupulous you’ll notice some anomalies. First of all, you never lose the impulse to speak about what you’ve seen. You cannot shut up – you just can’t. You’ll also discover that the one pain you wanted most to go away increases alarmingly: your words are unwelcome. You are turned away at every door. You lose the ability to remain blind to the fact that people prefer their images of you to you.

In theory, so what? But the immediacy of truth cuts straight through the theory, and it demands to know: Why this hurt? Where is it coming from?

Would you like to know where all this leads, so you can make an informed decision on whether to turn around?

One day, if an idealist has adequate courage and honesty, he will be forced to recognize that love is always and without exception rooted beyond the phenomenal (that is, in the metaphysical). We cannot dispense with the metaphysical without losing our capacity to care. We cannot protect ourselves and remain fully alive. And at this point, the one who meant to armor himself with spirituality discovers to his horror that he not only lacks armor, but also his skin. He is right out there, exposed, stinging, feeling everything and he has no choice in the matter.

Idealism – even existentialism – will not protect you for long. Find some other strategy – drugs, entertainments, a hectic and numbing lifestyle. Lose yourself in phenomena. For the love of God, don’t try to transcend this world if you’re seeking to escape it.

Please, be careful.

Reading plans

I finally finished Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology late last night.

Thinkers like Kant, Guenon, Hursserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Bernstein and (to some extent) Voegelin tend to clarify and articulate things I’ve already tacitly practically grasped. Reading them helps me account for myself to others. (This is important especially for work. I am never coming at things from the normal angle, so I always have a lot of explaining to do, at least until I win the trust of people I work with. My dream situation is to be that guy who is called in where people are unable to find any angle at all by which a problem can be grasped. There isn’t even a question that can be asked, much less answered. That’s home for me. As Wittgenstein said “A philosophical problem has the form: I don’t know my way about.”)

However,  the rarer thinkers who really nourish and energize me are the ones who throw me into states of alternating disorientation and insight that demand words, pictures, poems, myths. These are the thinkers who change you, sometimes radically, when you understand them… as a condition of understanding them at all. They keep the whole intellectual project firmly rooted in Why.

I’d planned to jump into Richard Rorty next, but now I think I might need to do a tour of Nietzsche again, and see how he reads for me now that I’ve acquired new modes of understanding and articulating. I do not believe he will blow me apart into inexplicable ecstatic insights like he used to. That makes me a little sad, but at the same time I am satisfied that I am making real progress.

Culture is the most interesting thing in the world

Youth is boring because everything a youth does is directly or indirectly related to biological reproduction.

Adults – and there are fewer adults than we think – are preoccupied with spiritual reproduction, or to put it in more conventional (but for that reason more readily misunderstandable) terms: culture.

Culture is humankind reinventing ourselves out of our last reinvention, again and again, in generational chains of existence. Each generation could be called the son or daughter of humankind, if you have an ear for that kind of language.

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Culture is the domain of adults. Within it youth strives for adulthood. Culture dominated by youth, where adults cling to youth and simulate youth, is culture in decline. The directional implication of decline is important.

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We think we are lonely because we have no community; that is, we lack means to unite our aggregation of friends. That is only the foreground. The background, the missing ground, of genuine, nourishing being-with, seeing-with, feeling-with – is culture. But we degrade culture by objectifying it into an aggregate of foreground artifacts. In fact, culture is what envelops us as we share the intersubjective experience of meaningful artifacts.

Our art traditions are the blueness of water under the ensphering sky. When we share a love of something we are together and we know with perfect certainty we are not alone.

(Human self-reinvention is the heights. The primordial ground is the base. The strange, mute instincts that flow up into us from who-knows-where is the depths. The depth of a thinker is his unbroken existential span, from knowing participation in depth, through reflective knowledge, to knowing participation in height.)

(Reading together is the intimacy of intimacies.)

Twos

I used to feel ecstatic riding my bicycle, knowing that this beautiful, simple machine, powered by my own body, could carry me anywhere I chose. I could go to work, or I could pass right by work and travel all the way to Tennessee, or deep into the north. I’d fantasize about maintaining a secret storehouse with all the tubes, tires, chains and spare parts I’d need for a life-time. I’d be free forever.

Now I ride my bicycle and I know that with each bump the frame is gradually weakening. The chain and all the parts are slowly corroding and grinding themselves down against each other. The tires are unrolling themselves into the road like tape, leaving an invisible path of rubber particles everywhere I go. I will need to replace it, bit by bit, by pieces made by other people. Maybe someday no original parts will remain, and this bicycle will exist as a tradition. I am riding over streets made by people, to places valuable solely because of the people there. And what is going on in my body? It is corroding, sickening, healing, weakening, strengthening, replacing its own substance, but its terminus is inevitable. As I ride, I rethink and resurrect the words of people who wrote and died, and I think about living people. And the things I think and have rethought in reading are meant to be told – they demand telling – if someone can hear them.

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If humankind were to perish I’d want no part of what remained. We are in this together; and if we can learn to accept and love this inescapable fact (and stop trying to fantasize ourselves out of it), we can seize our freedom to make our time here together easier to love. Life is still vast.

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Space repeats itself in time. Each moment contains the entirety of space. Space and time repeats itself in each subject. Each subject contains the entirety of space and time. We are forced through time and we move about in space. What about subject, I and We? Can we “move” there? Have you moved or been moved in the interlapping being of an other?

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An admittedly weird digression:

Hermes was the messenger of the Olympian gods who moved infinitely quickly, at the speed of thought. What sort of messages do you suppose he transmitted? Facts?

Janus, the double-faced Roman god of doors, was related to Hermes, and I think he can provide us a clue. From Wikipedia:

Historically, however, Janus was one of the few Roman gods who had no ready-made Greek counterpart, or analogous mythology. We can find in Greece Janus-like heads of gods related to Hermes, perhaps forming a compound god: Hermathena (a herm of Athena), Hermares, Hermaphroditus, Hermanubis, Hermalcibiades, and so on. In the case of these compounds it is disputed whether they indicated a herm with the head of Athena, or with a Janus-like head of both Hermes and Athena, or a figure compounded of both deities.

I enjoy the question of what divine thoughts moved through the split brain of Janus? Was it an inner dialogue? Was there a witnessing consciousness somewhere above or below? Was he of two minds, or one… or three…?

Nietzsche’s mask

One of the themes I’ve indexed on my wiki is the mask:

One of the most striking passages is from Beyond Good and Evil:

Everything profound loves a mask; the most profound things even have a hatred for image and parable. Might not nothing less than the antithesis be the proper disguise for the shame of a god walking abroad? A questionable question: it would be odd if some mystic had not already risked something to that effect in his mind. There are occurrences of such a delicate nature that one does well to cover them up with some rudeness to conceal them; there are actions of love and extravagant generosity after which nothing is more advisable than to take a stick and give the eyewitness a sound thrashing: that would cloud his memory. Some know how to cloud and abuse their own memory in order to have their revenge at least against this sole confidant:–shame is inventive. It is not the worst things that cause the worst shame: there is not only guile behind a mask–there is so much graciousness [Gute] in cunning. I could imagine that a human being who had to guard something precious and vulnerable might roll through life, rude and round as an old green wine cask with heavy hoops: the refinement of his shame would want it that way. A man whose shame is profound encounters even his destinies and delicate decisions on paths which few ever reach and whose mere existence his neighbors and closest intimates must not know: his mortal danger [Lebensgefahr] is concealed from their eyes, and so is his regained sureness of life [Lebens-Sicherheit]. Such a concealed man who instinctively needs speech for silence and to be silent and who is inexhaustible in his evasion of communication, wants and sees to it that a mask of him roams in his place through the hearts and heads of his friends; and supposing he did not want it, he would still realize some day that in spite of that a mask of him is there–and that this is good. Every profound spirit needs a mask: even more, around every profound spirit a mask is continually growing, owing to the constantly false, namely shallow, interpretation of every word, every step, every sign of life that he gives. —