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IS constrains us.
OUGHT compels us.
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IS belongs to all of us.
OUGHT belongs to each of us.
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IS manifests as the possibility or impossibility of actions and states-of-affairs.
OUGHT manifests as values (the degree of better or worse) of actions and states-of-affairs.
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IS governs what I am able to do in my situation.
OUGHT governs my response to my situation.
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The truth of IS — the domain of objective truth — limits what can and cannot develop (by the compulsion of OUGHT).
The truth of OUGHT — the domain of subjective truth — compels us to develop some possibilities and prevent the development of other possibilities (within the limits of IS).
The convergence of these two truths determines one’s worldview: 1) I am here, situated in a situation; 2) I am perceiving this situation; 3) I am responding to my situation; 4) I am (me), that is, I exist for others who, like myself, inhabit the place of I in a different but shared worldview; 4) I am changing, changed and changable, which means there is something at stake in this situation: my OUGHT pertains not only to what the world IS to become, but to who I am to become.
IS and OUGHT converges as a worldview with AM at its heart.
An error we make is to confuse is with ought and ought with is, and losing am in an is-less ought or an ought-less is.
Both objectivist reductionism (all subjectivity is reducible to objectivity) and subjectivist reductionism (all objectivity is reducible to subjectivity) destroys the responsibility of am.
Objectivist reductionism produces ethical realism (who see ideals as a private and subjective matter, and obey only circumstantial ethics imposed by social context, to which they are responsible, but for which they are not). Subjectivist reductionism produces moralistic idealists (who see reality as profanely public to which and for which they are not responsible, and so obey an inner law for inner purposes, taking responsibility only for themselves).
And most of us practice modal morality, oscillating between objective and subjective, barely coinciding at the point of transformation (like the fairly-tale couple who glimpse one another only at dawn and dusk) rather than finding enduring convergence.